US-Asia trade and critical minerals deals relevant to AI

US President Donald Trump has completed numerous deals with Asian partners regarding trade, critical minerals, and technology. Below we summarize the US-Asia trade and critical minerals deals relevant to AI*, as well as their potential implications for the US’s AI industry.

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Thailand

Critical minerals memorandum of understanding (MOU)

Key provisions | The October 26th critical minerals MOU) with Thailand does not directly mention artificial intelligence (AI). However, it does require US investments in the Thai critical mineral sector to “include provisions for technology transfer [from the US to Thailand], capacity building, and training of domestic personnel.” This could include AI training and technology relevant to mineral extraction and processing. 

It also includes provisions to boost the supply of critical minerals coming out of Thailand, many of which are necessary for the AI industry, including (a) enhanced investment in critical mineral extraction and processing; (b) first right of refusal for US investors on critical minerals investments in Thailand; and (c) regular meetings to discuss critical mineral supply challenges and investment opportunities. 

Impact |  In addition to potentially increasing access to and stability in critical mineral supply chains for US companies, this deal creates investment opportunities that work to the US AI industry’s advantage.

Trade framework agreement

Key provisions | The October 26th framework agreement does not explicitly discuss AI. However, it calls for resolving “long-standing intellectual property issues,” including the “patent backlog” and “circumvention of technological protection measures,” both of which could (but need not) refer to AI technologies. 

The framework provisions on digital trade, services, and investment relate more directly to AI. Key components include (a) refraining from imposing digital services taxes or measures that could negatively impact the US tech sector; (b) guaranteeing free, cross-border data transfer for business purposes; and (c) easing foreign ownership restrictions to enable US investment in the Thai telecommunications sector.

Impact | The Bangkok Post notes these provisions should increase Thailand’s attractiveness for US companies that invest and/or are active in digital infrastructure, cloud services, and/or general AI.

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Cambodia

Trade agreement

Key provisions | The October 26th trade agreement with Cambodia includes several AI-relevant provisions. Like Thailand, Cambodia agrees not to implement digital services taxes that could  harm or discriminate against US companies (Art. 3.1). They will also (a) avoid policy measures that negatively impact US digital services or digitally-distributed products; (b) cooperate with the US on cybersecurity; and (c) guarantee free, cross-border data transfer for business purposes (Art. 3.2). Cambodia additionally commits to consult with the US before signing any digital trade agreement that could “jeopardize essential US interests” (Art. 3.3) and to avoid creating a “digital competition regime” that “unreasonably or unjustifiably restricts US commerce” (Annex 1, Sec. B, Art. 2.1). Lastly, Cambodia agrees to facilitate US investment in Cambodian critical mineral resources and processing on the same terms offered to local investors (Art.6.1.1). 

Impact | These provisions make it easier for US companies to gain access to the Cambodian market generally and to Cambodian data and critical mineral resources specifically, providing useful inputs for the AI industry. They additionally make it possible for the US government to police and prevent potential Cambodian trade measures that could harm US interests. 

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Malaysia

Critical minerals MOU

Key provisions | The Oct 26 critical minerals MOU with Malaysia, like the Thai MOU, expresses general support for technological use and transfer and does not mention AI explicitly. Unlike the Thai MOU, the Malaysian deal does not require US investors to transfer technology or engage in capacity building. Regarding supply chain issues, the MOU aims to boost transparency and improve the Malaysian critical mineral sector’s competitiveness via regular discussion of supply challenges and investment opportunities. Malaysia also agrees to “prioritize investment from the United States in critical minerals assets.”

Impact | This deal seeks to enhance transparency regarding critical minerals and creates new opportunities for US investors in this sector, which could work to the US AI sector’s advantage. The absence of the tech transfer and capacity building requirement could also make Malaysia more attractive than Thailand for US companies, all other factors being equal.

Trade agreement

Key provisions | Many of the AI-relevant provisions of the October 26th trade agreement with Malaysia mirror those agreed to by Cambodia, including (a) refraining from digital services taxes and other policies that could harm or discriminate against US companies, digital services, or digitally-distributed products (Art. 3.1 and 3.2); (b) collaborating on cybersecurity (Art. 3.2); and (c) allowing the US to pre-approve potential digital trade agreements (Art. 3.3). However, the Malaysian agreement also differs in several ways: 

• Unlike Cambodia, Malaysia does not commit to “free” data transfer but rather to “cross-border transfer of data…with appropriate protections” (Art. 3.2). 

• The deal forbids Malaysia from making market access conditional on “access to a particular technology, production process, source code, or other proprietary knowledge” or on purchasing or using specified technologies, albeit with exceptions for listed software- and code-sharing clauses in commercial contracts, as well as for government procurement (Art. 3.4). 

• The deal requires Malaysia to eliminate a requirement that US cloud providers and social media platforms pay 6% of revenue generated in Malaysia into a domestic fund (Annex III, Sec. 3, Art. 3.1).

Impact | These provisions should create market advantages for US AI companies, decrease the costs and administrative burdens of doing business in Malaysia, and ensure protections against trade agreements potentially detrimental to US business interests.

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Vietnam

Trade framework agreement

Key provisions | The October 26th framework agreement with Vietnam does not mention AI. The only AI-relevant provisions are a general commitment to “finalize commitments on digital trade, and services and investment” and to cooperate “to enhance supply chain resilience.”

Impact | Negligible impact until deal is finalized.

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Japan

Critical minerals framework

Key provisions | The Oct 27 critical minerals framework with Japan commits to using “financial support mechanisms, trade measures…and critical minerals stockpiling systems” to diversify critical mineral supply chains and ensure sufficient supply for domestic industries (Sec. I.1). Other elements to fill supply chain gaps include (a) developing recycling technologies for rare earth scrap (Sec. I.6), (b) investing bilaterally in “projects of interest” (Sec. I.2), and (c) accelerating permitting processes (Sec. I.3). The deal increases transparency about critical mineral supply chains and resources by creating a U.S.-Japan Critical Minerals Supply Security Rapid Response Group (Sec. I.9) and through collaboration on critical mineral resources mapping (Sec. I.8). Finally, it initiates administrative reforms to enhance public (government) control over rare earth asset sales (Sec. I.5).

Impact | All of these provisions seem likely to improve the security of US AI companies’ supply chains. Project investment and permit acceleration may additionally create new economic opportunities. Finally, enhanced government control over asset sales could be beneficial, provided the government uses these powers to ensure American companies’ access to necessary materials. 

Technology prosperity MOU

Key provisions | The Oct 28 technology prosperity MOU with Japan sets out several cooperation areas to accelerate AI adoption and innovation in the US and Japan, many of which are similar to those included in the Korean MOU (see below). Key elements include: 

• Promoting export of US and Japanese AI stacks;

• Boosting interoperability via shared understandings of AI guidelines and frameworks;

• Supporting and cooperating on AI-relevant research, particularly related to “foundational infrastructure” comprised of quantum, semiconductor, and computing technologies; 

• Fostering STEM education for children; 

• Creating supportive policy frameworks for AI technology adoption and development; and 

• Collaborating on shared security measures related to sensitive technologies and supply chain resilience.

Impact | These measures signal government support for both the US and Japanese AI sectors. However, a lack of detailed commitments makes it difficult to evaluate if or when benefits may appear.

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South Korea

Technology prosperity MOU

Key provisions | Similar to the US-Japan MOU, the Oct 29 technology prosperity MOU with South Korea sets out several cooperation areas to accelerate AI adoption and innovation in the US and Korea. These include: 

• Promoting export of US and Korean AI stacks, including through expanded regional collaboration;

• Boosting the interoperability of AI systems and developing shared AI standards;

• Supporting AI-relevant research; 

• Fostering STEM education for children; 

• Creating supportive policy frameworks for AI technology adoption and development; and 

• Collaborating on shared security measures related to AI compute.

Impact | As with the US-Japan technology MOU, while all of these measures appear helpful for US AI companies, the lack of details makes it difficult to assess if or when positive impacts may occur.

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* Where the agreement text was publicly available at the time of writing, we included references to the relevant sections. Not all the agreements were finalized or or shared at the time of reporting.